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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a biracial, heterosexual, female Buddhist, new 
to Los Angeles and looking for a place to live.  Short of money, 
she notes the following roommate-wanted ads: 
 
1. We are three Christian females… We have weekly 
bible studies and bi-weekly times of fellowship.1 
2. The person applying for the room MUST be a 
 BLACK GAY MALE.2 
3. This is a Christian home and we are looking for a 
Christian female to rent a downstairs room.3 
 
She is unwelcome in at least two of the apartments, but 
each ad is presumptively illegal.  Fair housing laws prohibit dis-
crimination based on religion, race, sex and, in some jurisdic-
tions, sexual orientation.4  The federal Fair Housing Act 
(“FHA”) and many state statutes and municipal ordinances ex-
empt “Mrs. Murphy”5 landlords, who rent out rooms or apart-
ments in smaller buildings where they reside.  These landlords 
can usually discriminate when selecting tenants, so long as they 
do not advertise preferences or state discriminatory reasons for 
rejecting applicants.6  In most states, these exemptions apply to 
roommate-seekers, but some jurisdictions are more restrictive.7  
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act of 
18668 prohibits racial discrimination and many forms of national 
origin discrimination in housing,9 and several lower courts have 
concluded that the FHA does not preclude claims under the 1866 
Act.10  Thus, both Mrs. Murphy landlords and roommate seekers 
could be held liable for refusing to rent to people who are pro-
tected under the 1866 Act. 
Today, people seeking roommates outnumber classic 
Mrs. Murphy landlords,11 but, despite the distinct compatibility 
concerns involved, fair housing laws do not acknowledge this 
group as a separate category.  Whereas boarding house owners 
may impose rules upon tenants,12 compatibility is particularly 
important to roommates as their conflicts are typically resolved 
through discussion and compromise.  Many landlords who enjoy 
the Mrs. Murphy exemptions merely rent out separate apart-
ments in buildings where they also reside.  In this article, I ex-
plore whether fair housing laws violate the intimate association, 
privacy, and free speech rights of people seeking roommates to 
share their kitchens, bathrooms, and other common living areas.  
I examine three types of laws: prohibitions on using discrimina-
tory criteria when selecting a roommate, prohibitions on placing 
discriminatory advertisements, and prohibitions on making dis-
criminatory statements when interviewing potential candidates.  
In Part II, I describe several adjudications in the room-
mate context, including cases brought against Internet sites that 
provide forums and matching services for roommate seekers.   In 
Part III, I examine laws that bar discriminatory selection and 
conclude that federal intimate association and privacy rights, as 
well as privacy rights granted by the California constitution, are 
violated if individuals do not have a completely free choice in 
selecting a roommate.  In Part IV, I analyze advertising restric-
tions from both an intimate associate and privacy perspective 
and under the commercial speech doctrine.  I determine that, 
although such restrictions survive intimate association and pri-
vacy challenges, only restrictions on discriminatory ads related 
to race, ethnicity or national origin survive a free speech chal-
lenge.  In Part V, I explain why prohibitions on discriminatory 
statements are even more problematic, violating free speech, 
privacy and intimate association rights.  I conclude that, while it 
is wise policy to allow roommate seekers greater leeway in ad-
vertising some preferences, restrictions on ads expressing prefer-
ences related to race, national origin and ethnicity are not only 
constitutional, they are likely to advance the goals of the Fair 
Housing Act.  
 
 
II. THE ADJUDICATION OF ROOMMATE  
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
 
 Agency commissioners, and state and federal judges, 
have adjudicated cases brought by rebuffed roommate appli-
cants.   A brief survey of a few such cases provides context for 
the constitutional rights discussion that follows.13  
 
1. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE  
SELECTION AND STATEMENTS  
 
 In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. 
Larrick,14 two Caucasian women were seeking a third roommate 
“to share their unit and help pay the rent.”15 During a phone con-
versation, one of the women told a bi-racial applicant that her 
other roommate did not want to live with a black person.  The 
roommate seekers were found liable16 for discriminating on the 
basis of race and for making racially discriminatory statements.  
None of the exceptions to California’s Fair Housing code ap-
plied to the respondents because more than one roomer or 
boarder lived in the dwelling.17   
In Marya v. Slakey,18 an applicant sued the owner of a 
six-bedroom house after a co-tenant discriminated against her.  
The tenants executed a single lease and advertised and filled 
vacancies after one-on-one interviews.  Decisions on which can-
didate to select had to be unanimous, and all tenants had to be 
non-smoking, vegetarian students.  One tenant declined to inter-
view the applicant, explaining that two Indian women already 
lived in the house, and he did not want to live “with three people 
of the same cultural orientation.”19  The applicant alleged she 
had been denied housing on the basis of her race, color, national 
origin and/or sex.20  The court held that the Mrs. Murphy ex-
emption did not apply and would not have permitted discrimina-
tory statements in any case. The court did not conclude that the 
roommates were entitled to any special protections when creat-
ing criteria for cohabitants.21 
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2.  PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE SELECTION 
 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed a local ordi-
nance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in Sprague v. City of Madison.22  Two roommates extended 
an offer to a lesbian but later withdrew it, stating that they were 
not comfortable living with her. The court held that the ordi-
nance unambiguously applied in all housing rentals and rejected 
the appellants’ argument that it was unconstitutional in the 
roommate context: “Appellants gave up their unqualified right to 
such constitutional protections when they rented housing for 
profit.”23 Subsequent to commencement of the case, Madison’s 
City Council had amended the ordinance24 to exempt room-
mates, but the court nonetheless held the defendants liable.25  
The court’s conclusion that the solicitation of co-roommates 
constitutes “renting housing for profit,” and that renters who do 
so forfeit their privacy and First Amendment rights, may mean 
that people who lack the resources to live alone are particularly 
at risk of facing infringements on their constitutional rights.  
 
3. PROHIBITIONS ON STATEMENTS/ADVERTISEMENTS  
EXPRESSING PREFERENCES  
 
In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. 
DeSantis, a woman renter sought a roommate to share her two-
bedroom apartment “to help pay the rent.” 26  An African Ameri-
can male potential renter stated that the advertised room was too 
small, and asked to see the other bedroom.  The woman refused, 
indicating it was her room.  The applicant later claimed that she 
told him no room was available, and that she had denied him the 
rental due to his race.  A housing-
rights group sent one Caucasian and 
one African American tester to the 
apartment.  The respondent told the 
Caucasian tester that she “really 
[doesn’t] like black guys.  I try to be 
fair and all, but they scare me.”27  She 
was legally permitted to discriminate 
in selecting a roommate under Califor-
nia’s single roomer exemption, but 
was held liable for making a discrimi-
natory statement.28  
In Fair Housing Advocates 
Association v. McGlynn,29 a black 
female responded to an ad seeking a 
female roommate placed by a white 
male.  After inquiring about her race, he told her “blacks should 
live with blacks and whites should live with whites.”30  A fair 
housing organization then had testers contact the respondent.31  
His behavior suggested he may have been seeking not just room-
mate, but a girlfriend.32  He asked a black tester about her occu-
pation, if she smoked or drank, if she had a boyfriend and why 
she was not living with him, and if it would bother her that he 
was a white smoker who drank.33  He invited her to the apart-
ment, but she left after he asked her if she wanted a massage and 
then asked for a kiss.34  The respondent was found liable for 
placing a discriminatory ad and for making discriminatory state-
ments.35  
 
 
 
 
4. PERMITTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION  
DISCRIMINATION 
  
The commissioners in Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing v. Baker36 concluded that California’s statute pro-
hibiting sexual orientation discrimination did not apply to a 
roommate seeker.  The respondent rejected a lesbian applicant 
via voicemail, stating his other roommate was a Christian Fun-
damentalist, and they “would not get along too well.”37  The 
commissioners explained that sexual orientation discrimination 
was incorporated into California fair housing law through the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act,38 which applies only to “business estab-
lishments,”39 and “does not apply to those relationships that are 
truly private.”40  They further stated “truly private and social 
relationships” are protected by the right of intimate association, 
and held that the record did not reveal whether the respondent’s 
housemate relationship “was sufficiently non-continuous, non-
personal and non-social to preclude being a constitutionally pro-
tected intimate association.”41  The facts were thus insufficient 
to show that his “housing operation constituted a ‘business es-
tablishment’ rather than a constitutionally protected intimate 
association.”42  
 
5. CASES AGAINST INTERNET FORUMS OR ROOM-
MATE SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
In Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,43 a public interest consortium al-
leged that it had diverted substantial time and resources away 
from its fair housing program responding to Craigslist’s publica-
tion of discriminatory classified ads.44  
Many ads appeared to have been 
placed by roommate seekers.45  The 
court held that Craigslist was afforded 
immunity by the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA),46 under which 
providers of an interactive computer 
service are not to be treated as the 
publisher of information created by 
another content provider.  Because 
Craigslist served only “as a conduit” 
for information provided by its users, 
it was not liable for ads that violated 
fair housing laws.47  Roommate seek-
ers who place discriminatory ads may 
nonetheless be held individually liable 
as the content providers. Although the court’s analysis focused 
on the CDA, in affirming the decision of the district court, the 
Seventh Circuit hinted at the constitutional rights issues raised 
by the case, stating: “[A]ny rule that forbids truthful advertising 
of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters 
serious problems under the First Amendment.”48 
An online roommate matching service was similarly 
sued in Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com,49 but with a 
very different outcome.  Subscribers to the service respond to 
questionnaires by selecting answers in drop-down menus.50  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that “By requiring subscribers to pro-
vide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and 
by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate 
becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information 
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of 
that information.”51  The Court thus remanded the case for a 
The Court’s decision may mean that 
people who lack the resources to live 
alone are particularly at risk of fac-
ing infringements on their constitu-
tional rights.  
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determination as to whether Roommate’s publication of certain 
postings violates the FHA, “or whether they are protected by the 
First Amendment or other constitutional guarantees.”52 
   
 
III. OUTRIGHT BANS ON DISCRIMINATION 
 
1. FEDERAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS  
AND DISCRIMINATORY SELECTION 
 
In Roberts v. Jaycees, the Supreme Court suggested 
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association 
encompasses roommate relationships, explaining that “highly 
personal relationships” are protected because “individuals draw 
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with oth-
ers.”53  Though the Supreme Court specifically identified family 
relationships, the Court imagined other relationships would be 
similarly protected: 
 
Family relationships, by their nature, involve 
deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom 
one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.  
Among other things, therefore, they are distin-
guished by such attributes as relative small-
ness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions 
to begin and maintain the affiliation, and se-
clusion from others in critical aspects of the 
relationship.  As a general matter only rela-
tionships with theses sorts of qualities are 
likely to reflect the considerations that have 
led to an understanding of freedom of associa-
tion as an intrinsic element of personal lib-
erty.54  
 
The identification of “selectivity in decisions to begin and main-
tain the affiliation” underscores that relationships beyond blood 
ties are protected.  Because people cannot choose their families, 
if only familial relationships were protected, identifying 
“selectivity in decisions to begin” the association as a criterion 
for determining whether a relationship is protected would be 
incongruous.  Roommate relationships, in particular, are charac-
terized by each of the three factors identified by the Court in 
Roberts.  They are small, usually including no more individuals 
than there are bedrooms in a dwelling.  Most people are quite 
selective when deciding to live with another person—they are 
choosing someone who will have access to their possessions, 
pets and personal information.  And roommate relationships are 
highly secluded.  Roommates often see each other in their paja-
mas or underwear, and when they are sick, exhausted, or just 
sad.  People often hide from the rest of the world aspects of 
themselves that are unavoidably revealed in the privacy of the 
home.55   
Thus, denying the right to choose cohabitants based on 
personal criteria profoundly violates personal liberty, and fair 
housing laws that ban discrimination outright should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny’s least restrictive means test.  Yet, as 
“liberty and autonomy” mean little if individuals are powerless 
to decide with whom to create intimate relationships,56 no means 
of combating housing discrimination could be more restrictive.  
Prohibiting discriminatory selection only when housing is not 
shared is a reasonable alternative because the result would likely 
be the same.  Because a roommate seeker may consider many 
factors—compatible schedules, similar tastes in music or televi-
sion—she can state many reasons for rejecting an applicant, 
even if consciously or unconsciously her motivation is discrimi-
natory preference.  Furthermore, the exemption of Mrs. Murphy 
landlords from all but the advertising and statement prohibitions 
illustrates Congress’s belief that certain privacy interests are 
important enough to justify some sacrifice of the FHA’s goals.57  
Eliminating roommate choice is thus unlikely to pass the least-
restrictive-means test.     
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas58 has nonetheless led 
some to conclude that federal intimate association and privacy 
rights do not protect roommates.59 Six students challenged a 
zoning ordinance limiting the occupancy of single-family dwell-
ings to traditional families or to groups of not more than two 
unrelated persons.  The Court determined that the ordinance did 
not compromise any fundamental right to association or privacy.  
However, a zoning ordinance that prohibits groups of people 
from living in certain areas is quite different from a law that 
affirmatively requires an individual to accept a cohabitant.  The 
former only affects where people in an existing relationship may 
live, but the latter determines with whom an individual must 
create a relationship, at least if she cannot afford to live alone or 
would prefer to have a roommate.60    
In Carey v. Brown,61 the Supreme Court stressed the 
importance of residential privacy: “The States’ interest in pro-
tecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is 
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”62  
The Court continued, “Preserving the sanctity of the home, the 
one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape the 
tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important 
value.”63  Not only has the Court chosen to protect residential 
privacy,64 it has recognized privacy within the home as a consti-
tutional right.65  The range of contexts in which the right has 
been recognized suggests that it includes autonomy in determin-
ing the person roommate seekers are likely to greet first in the 
morning and see last at day’s end. 
 
2. PRIVACY RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE CALIFORNIA  
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS THAT PREVENT SEEKERS  
FROM ULTIMATELY SELECTING ROOMMATES  
 
At least nine state constitutions provide privacy protec-
tions more expansive than those afforded federally.66  In City of 
Santa Barbara v. Adamson,67 the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that California’s privacy right68 protects roommate rela-
tionships when it struck down a zoning ordinance prohibiting 
more than five unrelated persons from living together. The Court 
described the plaintiffs: 69 
 
They chose to reside with each other when 
Adamson made it known she was looking for 
congenial people with whom to share her 
house.  Since then, they explain, they have 
become a close group with social, economic 
and psychological commitments to each 
other . . . they have chosen to live together 
mainly because of their compatibility. . . . Ap-
pellants say that they regard their group as ‘a 
family’ and that they seek to share several 
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values of conventionally composed families.  
A living arrangement like theirs concededly 
does achieve many of the personal and practi-
cal needs served by traditional family living.70 
 
The Court concluded that California’s right to privacy encom-
passed the right to live with whomever one wishes, and Santa 
Barbara would have to show a compelling public interest in re-
stricting communal living.71   The highest Courts of New Jersey 
and New York have concluded that similar zoning laws violated 
state constitutional privacy or due process protections.72 
The three part test for invasions of privacy announced 
by the California Supreme Court in Hill v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association73 suggests that roommate relationships are 
protected beyond the zoning context and that roommate seekers 
should have autonomy in selecting cohabitants.  If a plaintiff 
establishes: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) 
conduct by [the] defendant constituting a serious invasion of 
privacy,” the defendant must show that the invasion substan-
tively furthers a countervailing interest.74  The plaintiff may re-
but that defendant’s assertion by showing there are alternatives 
with a lesser impact on privacy interests.75  
In Tom v. City and County of San Francisco,76 an ordi-
nance preventing tenants-in-common from excluding other co-
owners from their individual dwellings was struck down under 
this test.  After pooling resources to acquire multi-unit residen-
tial property, the co-owners signed right-of-occupancy agree-
ments specifying who would live in which unit.  The court ex-
plained the effect of the ordinance, which had been passed to 
discourage the conversion of rental housing to owner-occupied 
housing: “[U]nrelated persons . . . would be required to share 
occupancy of their dwelling units with each other, or could not 
prevent other cotenants from entering their private living 
space.”77  The court held that the city had articulated no interest 
that justified “an extreme privacy violation, such as rendering 
homeowners unable to determine the persons with whom they 
should live, or forcing them to share their homes with others 
who are unwelcome.”78  
Fair housing laws that prohibit discriminatory room-
mate selection have a greater impact on privacy.  The ordinance 
struck down in Tom prevented the contractual protection of pri-
vacy, and thus tenants-in-common could theoretically have been 
“forced to share their homes with others who [were] unwel-
come.”  But, as each co-owner was provided an individual 
dwelling by mutual agreement, it was unlikely anyone would 
actually invade another’s dwelling.  However, fair housing laws 
that require a roommate seeker to accept an applicant create 
more than a theoretical burden.  They force her to share her 
home with someone “who [is] unwelcome.”79  As virtually any 
alternative means of combating housing discrimination would 
have a lesser impact on privacy, such laws are unlikely to be 
upheld under California’s constitution.  
 
IV. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY  
ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
1. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND FEDERAL  
INTIMATE ASSOCIATION RIGHTS 
 
The Supreme Court set a high bar for determining when 
the right to intimate association has been violated, and federal 
appeals courts have followed suit.   Only laws that “directly and 
substantially”80 interfere with the relationship have been struck 
down, and laws creating significant burdens have been upheld 
even in the context of marriage, a relationship that is in most 
cases far more intimate than the relationships created between 
roommates.81  Even when roommate seekers desire a close com-
panion and not just someone to share the rent, advertising re-
strictions may require them to interview candidates whom they 
are unlikely to choose, but in most cases, the prohibitions do not 
prevent seekers from identifying suitable roommates and thus do 
not violate intimate association rights.  
In Zablocki v. Redhail,82 the touchstone case for the 
“direct and substantial” interference standard, the Court re-
viewed a statute requiring parents with child support obligations 
to obtain a court’s permission prior to remarriage.  It held that 
the law directly and substantially interfered with the fundamen-
tal right to marry, because it prevented people who could not 
prove they could pay child support from remarrying.83  How-
ever, the Court made clear that laws only implicating the right to 
marry would not face similar scrutiny: “[W]e do not mean to 
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to 
the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny.  [R]easonable regulations that do not sig-
nificantly interfere with the decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship may be legitimately imposed.”84  The Court found 
no significant interference in Califano v. Jobst,85 concluding that 
a Social Security Act provision terminating benefits for a de-
pendent, disabled adult upon marriage to someone ineligible for 
benefits did not directly and substantially interfere with the right 
to marry. 
The Court’s conclusions in Califano may have been 
influenced by its determination that the government has greater 
authority to attach conditions to recipients of its own benefits.  
However, in Montgomery v. Carr,86 the Sixth Circuit directly 
contrasted Zablocki and Califano without suggesting that a dif-
ferent standard applied in Califano because a government bene-
fit was involved.  Rather, the court explained “the directness and 
the substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry 
distinguish[ed]” the two cases.   It continued: “[w]hatever the 
form of the government action involved . . . rational basis scru-
tiny will apply to the rationales offered by government defen-
dants in cases presenting a claim that a plaintiff’s associational 
right to marry has been infringed, unless the burden on the right 
to marry is direct and substantial.”87  
Furthermore, under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, the government may not require a beneficiary to sur-
render a constitutional right as a condition to receiving a bene-
fit.88 The Supreme Court has been unpredictable in applying the 
doctrine,89 and has almost universally rejected challenges related 
to government welfare programs.90  But notably, in cases involv-
ing privacy in family relationships, the explanation as to why the 
laws under review were not found impermissible has been that 
the government’s condition either did not substantially deter the 
exercise of the rights,91 or its action was not sufficiently direct.92  
This analysis mirrors the direct and substantial interference test 
discussed in Zablocki and applied in the lower courts. 
Even presuming the threshold for direct and substantial 
interference varies with the government’s role, nothing in the 
case law suggests that requiring roommate seekers to interview 
additional applicants rises to the level of an unconstitutional 
burden.  Although the advertising restrictions remove a tool for 
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filtering out candidates whom roommate seekers are unlikely to 
accept, they create no limitation on seekers’ ability to say yes or 
no to any candidate and thus do not “significantly interfere” with 
the right to enter into the relationship.  Facial challenges succeed 
only where a law is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its 
applications.93  In the few cases where a roommate seeker could 
establish that the prohibitions actually prevented her from form-
ing a roommate relationship,94 she could bring an as-applied 
challenge.  In most cases, the restrictions pass the “direct and 
substantial interference” test and thus do not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
 
2. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND  
OTHER FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS  
 
Roommate seekers are unlikely to show that advertising 
restrictions violate their privacy rights under the undue burden 
standard that the Supreme Court has created in other privacy 
contexts: access to abortion or contraceptives. In Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held 
that a twenty-four hour waiting period for abortions imposed a 
‘particularly burdensome’ obstacle on women with the fewest 
resources, “those who must travel long distances, and those who 
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, em-
ployers, or others,”95 but that “[did] not demonstrate that the 
waiting period constitute[d] an undue burden.”96  Given this 
high bar, even if advertising restrictions require a person to in-
terview ten times as many 
candidates in order to locate a 
roommate, the burden they 
create is unlikely to be 
deemed “undue,” particularly 
because decisions involving 
cohabitation are less funda-
mental than decisions involv-
ing reproduction. 
The Court’s decision 
in Carey v. Population Ser-
vices, International97 does 
suggest that its standard for 
reviewing infringements on 
privacy may sometimes be 
lower than the abortion cases 
indicate.  The Court struck down a New York statute permitting 
only licensed pharmacists to sell contraceptives, concluding that 
it imposed a “significant burden” on the right to use contracep-
tives.98  At first blush, it seems this law simply made it less con-
venient for women to obtain contraceptives and was thus not so 
dissimilar from the roommate advertising prohibitions.  How-
ever, the Court stated that although not a total ban, the law sig-
nificantly reduced public access to contraceptives by increasing 
costs and reducing privacy.99  In New York’s many small towns 
in 1977,100 where there may only have been one pharmacy, re-
quiring an unmarried woman to interact with a pharmacist every 
time she wanted to buy contraceptives could result in a decision 
to forgo the purchase entirely.  In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan emphasized that the law burdened the right to prevent 
conception “by substantially limiting access to the means of 
effectuating that decision.”101  
To some extent, advertising prohibitions “limit access 
to the means” of finding a roommate, because searches become 
more time-consuming and costly if people must interview un-
suitable applicants.  However, it is unlikely that this would be 
deemed a substantial limitation because the restrictions do not 
limit whom a roommate seeker may consider or where she can 
place her ads.  They only require her to consider a broader group 
of applicants than she might otherwise prefer, and ultimately she 
controls the amount of time she dedicates to her search. More-
over, she maintains a great deal of control through her ad place-
ment decisions.  This is quite different from Carey, in which the 
restrictions on how contraceptives could be distributed resulted 
in a significant reduction in access not just to one’s choice of 
contraceptive but to any contraceptives.  Therefore, the restric-
tions on roommate ads are not unduly burdensome to the point 
of violating the constitutional right to privacy. 
 
3. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS  
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
 
Under California’s state privacy standard, a roommate 
seeker is unlikely to show that advertising prohibitions are an 
invasion of privacy.  She must establish: “(1) a legally protected 
privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
circumstances; and (3) conduct by [the] defendant constituting a 
serious invasion of privacy.”102  People have a privacy interest in 
selecting a roommate, but not a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy “in the circumstances.”  Because ads are a means of public 
communication, it is logical that the interests of those who read 
ads, and not just those who place them, would be considered 
when regulating content.  
Furthermore, the restrictions on discriminatory 
ads do not constitute a “serious invasion of 
privacy,” because in most cases, they do not 
actually prevent a roommate seeker from locat-
ing a suitable roommate, but merely require 
him to interview additional candidates.103  It is 
in this third step that roommate advertising 
differs from advertising for romantic partners.  
Although such romantic partner ads are also a 
means of public communication, people are 
likely to have far more particularized criteria in 
a greater number of areas when seeking 
mates.104  Advertising restrictions could sub-
stantially interfere with locating a compatible 
companion due to the combination of character-
istics sought.  Moreover, there is typically a significantly higher 
level of anxiety and fear of rejection105 involved with 
“interviewing” potential lovers than there is with interviewing 
potential roommates.  Therefore, forcing those looking for love 
to “interview” many more applicants does constitute a much 
more serious invasion of privacy.  
 
4. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
 
The Supreme Court has explained that commercial 
speech may be distinguished “by its content”106 and has catego-
rized speech that “inform[s] the public of the availability, nature, 
and prices of products and services,”107 and speech in which the 
speaker’s interests are “largely economic,” as commercial.108  It 
has further explained that the “diverse motives, means and mes-
sages of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely 
varying degrees,” but that advertising “may be subject to reason-
able regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.”109  
Roommate ads apprise the public of the availability of rental 
People have a privacy interest in se-
lecting a roommate, but not a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy “in 
the circumstances.”   
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housing, and although roommate relationships may be intimate, 
the ads placed by roommate seekers propose transactions that 
benefit them financially by reducing housing costs.  Indeed, in 
the cases discussed in Part II, multiple 
roommate seekers indicated that their 
motives for seeking a roommate were 
financial.110  Moreover, offering shared 
living space is not “inextricably inter-
twined”111 with stating a roommate 
seeker’s discriminatory criteria regarding 
those with whom she wants to create an 
intimate association: As was discussed 
in Part IV.1, prohibitions on discriminatory ads rarely prevent a 
roommate seeker from locating a cohabitant.   
Roommate ads should thus be evaluated as commercial 
speech, and their regulation evaluated under the four-part test 
articulated in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. 
Public Services Commission of New York.112  First, the speech 
must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading.  Sec-
ond, the government must assert a substantial interest.  Third, 
the regulation must advance that interest, and fourth, it may not 
be “more extensive than necessary.”113  This does not mean the 
absolute least restrictive means; rather, the government has a 
burden of affirmatively establishing a “reasonable fit” between 
its interest and the speech restriction.114  If, as discussed in Part 
III, the right to choose cohabitants is constitutionally protected 
under federal intimate association or federal or state privacy 
rights, then discriminatory roommate ads describe lawful activ-
ity and are not misleading.  Because the first prong of Central 
Hudson is satisfied in the roommate context, the government 
must show a substantial interest in barring the ads, and that the 
restrictions advance the interest asserted without being more 
extensive than necessary.  
 
A. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED TO RACE, NA-
TIONAL ORIGIN OR ANCESTRY 
 
 Achieving residential integration was one of Con-
gress’s primary goals when the FHA was enacted in 1968.115  
Nearly forty years later, racially homogenous housing patterns 
continue to be a serious concern.116  Thus, the government con-
tinues to have a substantial interest in preventing housing dis-
crimination based on race.  Despite the fact that roommate seek-
ers may ultimately select whomever they wish as cohabitants, 
any racially discriminatory housing ads in public forums frus-
trate the integration of communities by stigmatizing minorities 
and creating animosity.  Thus, as a means of combating racially 
homogenous housing patterns, a direct and concrete harm, ad-
vertising prohibitions do advance the goals of the FHA and are a 
means no more extensive than necessary to achieve those goals. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Linmark 
Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro117 reveals an unwillingness to 
uphold laws enacted to promote integrated housing when the 
burden on individual rights is too great.118  The Court struck 
down a ban on “For Sale” signs, despite a city’s contention that 
promoting integration justified the ordinance because fear 
among white homeowners that their property values would drop 
as the town’s black population increased had caused “panic sell-
ing.”119  The Court sharply denounced the city’s restriction on 
the free flow of information.120  However, its decision must be 
considered in light of the type of restriction under review.  “For 
Sale” signs are a widely-used means of advertising the availabil-
ity of property.  Thus, the city was depriving its residents of 
commercial speech rights enjoyed by virtually all other home-
owners.  In contrast, prohibitions on discriminatory housing ads 
are the norm, not the exception.   
Furthermore, unlike “For Sale” signs that, on 
their face, send no stigmatizing message, 
discriminatory housing ads are per se harm-
ful and inflict an immediate harm on those 
they degrade.  In Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc.,121 the Supreme Court upheld restrictions 
prohibiting lawyers from soliciting personal 
injury or wrongful death clients within thirty 
days of an accident under the Central Hudson test.122  It found 
the attorney ads offended their recipients and tarnished the repu-
tation of attorneys, and that the government has a substantial 
interest in restricting speech that both creates an immediate harm 
and has a demonstrable detrimental effect on a particular group.  
The Court distinguished its decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drugs 
Products Corp., striking down a federal ban on direct-mail ad-
vertisements for contraceptives, on the grounds that the harm 
that the attorney solicitations caused could not be “eliminated by 
a brief journey to the trash can.”123   Whereas contraceptive ads 
may offend some people, they did not substantially burden re-
cipients who could simply dispose of them. 
Similar to the attorney solicitations in Florida Bar that 
were likely to create “outrage and irritation”124 in their recipi-
ents, racially discriminatory ads are likely to have an analogous 
immediate impact on those they degrade.125  And, just as the 
Court found that disposing of the attorney solicitations did little 
to combat the offense they generated, once a discriminatory ad 
has been read, its harm is not easily undone.   
Moreover, like the ads in Florida Bar, racially dis-
criminatory ads create a secondary harm by perpetuating racially 
homogenous housing patterns.  In United States v. Hunter,126 the 
Fourth Circuit found a newspaper editor liable under 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(c) for publishing a Mrs. Murphy’s ad for an apartment in a 
“white home.”  The court explained how seeing significant num-
bers of such ads in one part of a city could deter non-whites 
from seeking housing in those neighborhoods, even if other 
dwellings were available in those areas on a non-discriminatory 
basis.127  It further explained that prohibiting even exempt land-
lords from placing discriminatory ads served the FHA’s purpose 
because wide circulation of statements of personal prejudice 
could magnify their negative effect.128  The wide distribution of 
roommate ads stating racially discriminatory preferences may 
similarly deter applicants from applying for roommate situations 
in certain areas.  It is not unlikely that people with racist atti-
tudes live in more racially homogenous neighborhoods.  If an 
applicant sees multiple racially discriminatory roommate listings 
in a particular neighborhood, she may determine that it would be 
wiser to seek housing elsewhere, thereby perpetuating the exist-
ing housing pattern.   
Further, racially discriminatory housing ads stigmatize 
minorities, frustrating the integration of communities.  In his 
writings on racial stigma and African Americans, economist 
Glenn C. Loury describes two kinds of behavior: discrimination 
in contract (in the execution of formal transactions) and dis-
crimination in contact (in the personal associations and relation-
ships created in the private spheres of life).129  Both have debili-
tating consequences because the rules of contract and patterns of 
contact control access to resources and social mobility.130  
“Liberty and autonomy” would become meaningless if people 
It is not unlikely that people 
with racist attitudes live in 
more racially homogenous 
neighborhoods. 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 9  
 
could not discriminate when creating personal relationships, and 
thus discrimination in contact must remain a prerogative.131  
However, differential treatment of individuals in contract—
including housing—can be legitimately regulated because it 
significantly contributes to racial inequality and stigma.132  
A 2000 study measuring preferences among various 
ethnic groups in Los Angeles illustrates the effects of racial 
stigma on housing.133  Subjects were asked to imagine the racial 
mix of a neighborhood in which they would feel most comfort-
able.  Forty percent of Asians, thirty-two percents of Latinos, 
and nineteen percent of whites envisioned neighborhoods with 
no African Americans, and immigrants were more likely to ex-
clude African Americans.134  This suggests that new arrivals to 
America are taught that African Americans are a group to be 
avoided.135  Because discriminatory housing ads are widely cir-
culated, they are likely to contribute to this stigmatization, even 
in cases in which the underlying discrimination is legal.  Restric-
tions on roommate ads are not simply a case of the government 
restricting speech in order to combat the spread of beliefs with 
which it disagrees.  Rather, it is regulating housing-related com-
mercial speech to counteract a concrete housing-related harm.  
The government’s substantial interest in promoting integration 
thus meets the third prong of the Central Hudson test. 
One might argue that prohibiting discriminatory ads 
actually contributes to racially homogenous housing patterns 
because allowing people to 
candidly state preferences 
may encourage minorities to 
seek housing where they oth-
erwise might not.136  If stat-
ing preferences is legal, mi-
nority applicants may assume 
that those who do not state such preferences would welcome 
them.137  To the contrary, if stating preferences is prohibited and 
in a predominantly white neighborhood half the roommate seek-
ers are open to minority applicants and half are not, to create a 
“match,” a minority applicant would have to visit twice as many 
apartments in that neighborhood.138  The applicant may not have 
formal knowledge of those statistics, but over time and talking to 
others, she may come to suspect it and decide to avoid the white 
neighborhood, thereby reinforcing the existing housing pat-
tern.139  
While this model is plausible, the “ifs” are significant.  
If the percentage of roommate seekers in the white neighbor-
hood who welcome minority applicants is more like 80% or 
90%, the number of homes that the applicant would need to visit 
in order to create a “match” drops considerably, and the stigma-
tizing effects of discriminatory ads in widely circulated media 
may reinforce existing housing patterns more than prohibitions 
do.  While it is plausible that if discriminatory ads are allowed, 
the absence of a stated preference may be turned into a positive, 
the opposite is equally plausible.  Seeing some racist ads may 
create the impression that prejudice is more widespread than it 
actually is.  Applicants might assume that many more people are 
racists—particularly people who live in areas with a dispropor-
tionate number of discriminatory ads—but do not want to admit 
their prejudices in print.   
Where there are conflicting factual theories, legislatures 
have latitude in shaping policy. In commercial speech and other 
First Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has often de-
ferred to legislative judgments.140  When the FHA was enacted, 
Congress decided that even those who are allowed to discrimi-
nate could not publish discriminatory ads related to race, color, 
religion, or national origin.141  The same arguments would apply 
regarding the number of Mrs. Murphy landlords that a minority 
boarder or renter would need to meet in order to create a 
“match” and locate housing in a predominantly white neighbor-
hood, but Congress determined that the advertising restrictions 
were a necessary tool in achieving its integration goals.  
The last prong of the Central Hudson test is thus satis-
fied.  Although roommate seekers cannot ultimately be forced to 
live with someone against their will, because racially discrimina-
tory ads stigmatize minority groups in a manner that frustrates 
integrated housing goals, eliminating such ads from widely ac-
cessed public media is a means no more extensive than neces-
sary to further the government’s interest in promoting integrated 
neighborhoods.  Thus, as long as Central Hudson remains the 
controlling test for commercial speech,142 roommate ads that 
discriminate on the basis of race, ancestry or national origin may 
be prohibited.  
 
B. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED  
TO OTHER PROTECTED CATEGORIES 
 
It is less clear that barring other types of discriminatory 
ads, like those expressing preferences based on sexual-
orientation or religious practice,143 passes the Central Hudson 
test.  The government has a substantial inter-
est in assuring that all citizens have equal 
access to housing, but because roommate 
seekers can ultimately choose their cohabi-
tants, preventing them from advertising their 
preferences does not make any additional 
housing available to those with whom they 
prefer not to live.   Whereas the FHA’s legislative history is re-
plete with discussions regarding the need to racially integrate 
housing,144 its history does not suggest that lawmakers were 
concerned with integrating housing along other than racial 
lines.145  Thus, prohibiting ads stating preferences unrelated to 
race does not serve the independent legislative objective of inte-
gration.  These ads do risk creating psychological injury and 
stigma, but the Supreme Court has held that the government may 
not restrict speech only to prevent such harms.  Its decision in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,146 striking down an ordinance that 
made it a misdemeanor to use inflammatory symbols to know-
ingly arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion or gender,” illustrates that a more 
tangible interest is required to overcome a First Amendment 
challenge.  Racially discriminatory ads are unique because they 
frustrate the integration of neighborhoods.  
A second reason for applying advertising restrictions to 
Mrs. Murphy landlords, and to roommate seekers, is that these 
ads could create a false impression that housing discrimination is 
legal.147  People may see ads placed by individuals who are 
uniquely allowed to discriminate, and mistakenly believe that 
any landlord may do so.148  But, while preventing confusion may 
be a substantial government interest, it can likely be achieved 
without a total ban.  Such a ban would be “more extensive than 
necessary” because a policy to educate would suffice:  Disclaim-
ers explaining that housing discrimination is illegal outside the 
roommate context could be mandated in any ad stating a dis-
criminatory preference.149  Restrictions that create a total ban on 
discriminatory ads unrelated to race, national origin, or ancestry 
therefore likely fail the fourth step of Central Hudson. 
while preventing confusion may be a 
substantial government interest, it can 
likely be achieved without a total ban. 
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c. ADS THAT USE RELIGION AS A PROXY FOR ETHNICITY 
 
The difficult area is when race, national origin and an-
cestry categories overlap with religion.  In Saint Francis College 
v. Al-Khazraji, Justice Brennan explained “the line between dis-
crimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics [] and 
discrimination based on place or nation of ... origin, [] is not a 
bright one.” 150  Similarly, for members of some religious 
groups, like Muslims, Jews, Sikhs and Hindus, membership in 
the religious group is equated with an ethnic distinction, not 
simply a distinction based on belief.  And, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866151 created protection for Jews against racial discrimina-
tion—protection that remains intact.152  Thus, religious prefer-
ences in roommate ads must not be used as a means to skirt the 
prohibitions on discriminatory ads related to race, national ori-
gin, or ancestry.  The intense discrimination faced by people 
identified with Islam since September 11, 2001153 could eventu-
ally drive them into segregated enclaves.  And, although some 
may argue that antireligious statements are too tangential to the 
government’s interest in promoting integration to fall within the 
“substantial interest,” all groups who could face discrimination 
on the basis of race must be treated equally in this context.  In 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the idea that judges are equipped to draw lines 
as to which groups deserve protection against such discrimina-
tion.154  Although discrimination against certain ethnic groups 
may have more harmful effects in various circumstances, all are 
to be afforded equal protection. 
How then to discern the prohib-
ited religion-as-ethnicity ads from the 
permissible religion-as-belief ads?  Ads 
that describe the religious practices that 
roommate seekers perform within the 
home—like keeping kosher, prohibiting 
alcohol for religious reasons, studying 
the bible, or praying, would suggest that 
the roommate seeker’s preference for a 
roommate of a particular religion is re-
lated to her belief system: she is not sim-
ply using religion as a proxy for ethnic-
ity.  Under this approach, an ad that 
states “no Jews” or “no Muslims” or “no 
Hindus” would be prohibited.  However, 
a religious roommate seeker looking for 
a roommate who keeps kosher or observes Ramadan155 could 
state so in her ad.  Ads that state “no fundamentalists” or “no 
Atheists” would also be permissible, because they focus on reli-
gious ideology and not ethnicity.  The tougher case would be ads 
that read “no Catholics” or “no Protestants” or “no Christians,” 
as these religions are not identified with a particular race or an-
cestry.  However, they should nonetheless be prohibited.  Other-
wise, individuals whose national origin or ethnic group is identi-
fied with a particular religion would be granted special rights to 
discriminate: a result that would probably not survive an equal 
protection challenge.156  
 
5. ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR ADVERTISEMENTS  
THAT STATE RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES  
 
Homogeneity of tastes, attitudes and orientations help 
create a successful living arrangement,157 especially when they 
stem from religious beliefs.158  Because religious practice can 
overlap with the organization of a household, locating cohabi-
tants who share their faith and practices may be uniquely impor-
tant for devout roommate seekers.   When there are few fellow 
practitioners in the communities where religious individuals 
live, the advertising restrictions may make it extremely difficult 
for devout roommate seekers to locate suitable cohabitants.  
Several provisions in existing legal doctrine may provide addi-
tional grounds for as-applied challenges in these cases.  
 
 
a. RFRAS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER RELIGIOUS  
EXERCISE CLAUSES  
 
 Living with an individual of another faith could seri-
ously burden the religious exercise of some roommate seekers.  
An Orthodox Jew who maintains a kosher kitchen may be con-
cerned that a roommate who does not share her devotion would 
compromise her practice—perhaps by eating meat on a plate 
restricted to dairy.159  Some Hindus may believe that living with 
an individual who is not a member of their caste jeopardizes 
their reincarnation.160  Restrictions on birthday and holiday cele-
brations could make cohabitation with people of other faiths a 
serious burden for a Jehovah’s Witness.161  In towns or cities 
with large populations of people practicing their faiths, these 
roommate seekers could probably locate roommates by placing 
non-discriminatory ads in places where fellow practitioners con-
gregate.162  However, when roommate seekers are part of a small 
minority, the restrictions may prevent them from finding a suit-
able cohabitant and therefore pose a 
serious burden, particularly if they 
cannot afford to live alone. 
 The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith163 created an obsta-
cle for such roommate seekers to 
invoke the free exercise clause of 
the First Amendment as a defense to 
fair housing laws.  The Court con-
cluded that the clause does not apply 
to statutes of general applicability 
that are not directed at religious 
practice.  However, Congress re-
sponded by passing the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),164 exempting indi-
viduals from generally applicable laws that substantially burden 
their exercise of religion, unless the government shows the law 
is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling govern-
ment interest.  Twelve states have since enacted state RFRAs.165  
The Supreme Court later held that the federal RFRA could not 
constitutionally restrict state laws,166 but RFRA’s application to 
federal laws continues,167 and state RFRAs continue to apply to 
state laws.  Furthermore, many states apply a compelling interest 
test similar to the Sherbert-Yoder168 test for infringements on 
free exercise rights granted by their state constitutions.169 
 State RFRAs or state religious free exercise constitu-
tional provisions are a possible source of protection for devout 
roommate seekers whose religious practice is substantially bur-
dened by the advertising prohibitions.  Religious landlords 
whose beliefs would be compromised by renting to unmarried 
cohabitants have sought protection under these provisions.  The 
individuals whose national origin or 
ethnic group is identified with a par-
ticular religion would be granted 
special rights to discriminate: a re-
sult that would probably not survive 
an equal protection challenge. 
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law remains largely unsettled, but some courts have found merit 
in the landlords’ claims.170 The California Supreme Court de-
clined to uphold such a landlord’s free exercise rights in Smith v. 
Fair Housing and Employment Commission (Evelyn Smith),171 
but the factors outlined by the court suggest that a burdened 
roommate seeker could be protected under a RFRA: 172   
 
(1) The burden must fall on a religious 
belief rather than a philosophy or a way of 
life.  (2) The burdened religious belief 
must be sincerely held.  (3) The plaintiff 
must prove the burden is substantial or, in 
other words, legally significant.  (4) If all 
the foregoing are true, the government 
must demonstrate that application of the 
burden to the person is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and is 
the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling government interest.173  
 
Religious roommate seekers likely meet each of the four parts of 
this test: (1) The housing laws burden religious belief (2) that is 
sincerely held;  (3) the burden is substantial because the laws 
prevent the devout seeker from locating a roommate who will 
not interfere with her religious practice; and (4) as described in 
Part IV.4.b, the government is unlikely to demonstrate that pro-
hibiting ads unrelated to race is a means no more extensive than 
necessary of furthering a compelling state interest.  In theory,174 
the least restrictive means standard creates an even higher bur-
den on the government.175  Roommate seekers whose free exer-
cise of religion would be burdened if they were unable to locate 
a cohabitant would virtually always be describing their religious 
practices (like dietary restrictions, observing the Sabbath, or 
barring alcohol within their dwelling) in their advertisements.  
Therefore, the preferences would describe religion in terms of 
belief, and not as a stigmatizing proxy for ethnicity.176  Thus, 
prohibitions on these advertisements would not survive even 
intermediate scrutiny.177 
 Nonetheless, to raise a RFRA defense, unless a room-
mate seeker lives in a jurisdiction recognizing an affirmative 
right to have a roommate, she would need to show that she actu-
ally could not afford to live alone – not merely that living alone 
costs more.  The Evelyn Smith court explained: “an incidental 
burden on religious exercise is not substantial if it can be de-
scribed as simply making religious exercise more expensive.”178  
Given the large number of renters for whom housing costs are 
categorized as “severe cost burdens,”179 some roommate seekers 
are likely to make this showing.  Perhaps some could find less 
desirable housing that required a longer commute or was located 
in a more dangerous part of town, but denying a renter safe, con-
venient housing may indeed be held a substantial burden on her 
religious practice.  Thus, RFRAs or state free exercise clauses 
interpreted to follow Sherbert and Yoder may provide some reli-
gious roommate seekers with a defense to generally applicable 
fair housing laws.  
 
B. RIGHTS TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
 
 In some cases, roommate seekers are looking for people 
with whom they can build a religious community for purposes of 
expressive association.  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the First Amendment right “to associ-
ate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”180  Even 
when a challenged action is not specifically directed to the free-
dom of association for free speech purposes, strict scrutiny is 
applied to infringements on that right.181  To come within First 
Amendment protection, a group must engage in some form of 
public or private expression.182  The association’s aim need not 
be disseminating a certain message or expressing its views to the 
public.183  Expression within the community suffices; the asso-
ciation need only engage in expressive activity “that could be 
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”184  
 Roommate seekers attempting to create an association 
for the purpose of communal prayer or bible study would likely 
be afforded “traditional First Amendment”185 protection: “We 
are three Christian females . . . . We have weekly bible studies 
and bi-weekly times of fellowship.”186  As only a small subset of 
people who respond to roommate ads would be interested in 
such a relationship, prohibiting these roommate seekers from 
advertising specific religious practices could substantially inter-
fere with their ability to identify applicants.187  As discussed, the 
government is unlikely to demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est that justifies prohibitions on roommate ads stating prefer-
ences unrelated to race even under the less rigorous “no more 
extensive than necessary” standard.188  The Supreme Court has 
rejected the suppression of speech that impairs an association’s 
expressive message on First Amendment grounds.189  By pre-
venting the creation of the association, restrictions that prevent a 
roommate seeker from identifying a co-worshipper create just as 
great an injury to the right of expressive association.190   
 
V. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS 
 
The FHA’s prohibitions on discriminatory statements 
make illegal any statement “that indicates any preference, limita-
tion, or discrimination” or indicates “an intention to make any 
such preference, limitation, or discrimination,” if based on a 
protected characteristic.191  Courts have consistently interpreted 
“indicates” to mean indicates “to an ordinary reader” or “to an 
ordinary listener,” regardless of the speaker’s actual intent.192  
Thus, roommate seekers who make statements or ask questions 
that “an ordinary listener” interprets as indicating an intention to 
make a preference related to a protected characteristic could be 
held liable under § 3604(c).  Phrases as seemingly innocuous as 
“religious landmark” or “retired,” and even the word 
“integrated” are potential sources of liability.193  Inquiries about 
issues like religion194 or, in jurisdictions where it is protected, 
sexual orientation, are prohibited.  A roommate seeker could be 
found in violation of the law for describing her own religious 
practices or sexual orientation, if it would seem to “an ordinary 
listener” that the statements indicate a discriminatory preference.  
The restrictions thus effectively create a category of taboo sub-
jects that people who are considering living together may not 
discuss without risking liability.   
 
1. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS AND  
DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS  
 
Limiting the subjects that potential cohabitants can 
discuss may substantially burden roommate seekers’ ability to 
create successful roommate relationships and to feel comfortable 
in their homes.  For example, the restrictions could adversely 
affect an Orthodox Jew who observes Shabbat195 and must as-
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certain that her future roommate will not interfere with her prac-
tice.  So too for the devout Muslim who prays in the living room 
– the only room in the apartment with an Eastward facing win-
dow – several times a day, or the Evangelical Christian who 
holds weekly bible studies around the kitchen table.  These indi-
viduals would want to confirm that a roommate will not inter-
rupt their worship by turning on a television or stereo in their 
common space while they are deep in prayer or study.  Disclo-
sure of these practices also serves applicants’ interests.   An ap-
plicant who wants to watch Oprah may be annoyed if her room-
mate commandeers the living room for prayer, just as an appli-
cant who does not participate in bible study may resent lost ac-
cess to her kitchen each week.  Because it is likely that tensions 
would later arise as a result of these undisclosed competing de-
sires, a devout roommate seeker could be significantly burdened 
if unable to discuss her religious practice with a potential co-
habitant.  The statement prohibitions thus directly and substan-
tially prevent her from establishing 
a workable roommate relationship, 
and therefore violate her intimate 
association rights.   
Privacy rights are similarly 
infringed.  If an evangelical Chris-
tian who truly believes that homo-
sexuality is a sin winds up with a 
lesbian roommate because she was 
unable to determine an applicant’s orientation prospectively, 
greeting her roommate’s lover in the bathroom several mornings 
a week may make her acutely aware that behavior that violates 
her belief system is occurring within her home.  The result may 
be feelings of alienation in “the one retreat to which men and 
women [are supposed to be able to] repair to escape the tribula-
tions of their daily pursuits.”196  If an individual cannot exercise 
enough control over the composition of her household to create 
an environment in which she feels at ease, the right to privacy 
seems little more than a platitude.  Therefore, under such cir-
cumstances, statement prohibitions would likely violate the test 
outlined in Carey v. Population Services, International.  Just as 
limiting the distribution of contraceptives to licensed pharma-
cists “burden[ed] an individual’s right to decide to prevent con-
ception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access 
to the means of effectuating that decision,”197 statement prohibi-
tions that prevent a roommate seeker from talking about critical 
aspects of her personal life or from asking a candidate about 
matters of great importance to her, substantially limit her ability 
to effectively select future roommates. 
Unlike advertising prohibitions, statement prohibitions 
actually prevent a roommate seeker from finding a compatible 
cohabitant.  That is, a roommate seeker who is religious, has 
strong feelings about homosexuality or politics,198 or cares about 
national origin or race but cannot discern an applicant’s ancestry 
by looking at her, would be unable to find a suitable cohabitant.  
Unlike advertising prohibitions, which increase the size of the 
applicant pool that a roommate seeker must consider, but do not 
“directly and substantially” interfere with the right to form an 
intimate association or unduly burden privacy, statement prohi-
bitions may make it impossible for a roommate seeker to deter-
mine that an applicant is someone with whom she wants to form 
an intimate association—someone to whom she will reveal her 
“backstage” self.199  Thus, they do “directly and substantially” 
interfere with her right to intimate association and create an 
“undue burden” on her privacy rights.   
 
2. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND  
STATEMENT PROHIBITIONS 
 
Prohibitions on discriminatory statements unrelated to 
race, national origin or ancestry do not require new analysis.  
Even if statements made during the interview process are con-
sidered commercial speech, prohibitions on such statements fail 
the Central Hudson test just as prohibitions on parallel adver-
tisements fail because the government is unlikely to establish 
that such restrictions are no more extensive then necessary to 
further a substantial government interest.    
However, prohibitions on discriminatory statements 
related to race, national origin or ancestry require a fresh look.  
The government maintains its interest in integration, but state-
ments made in private are unlikely to undermine this objective 
and contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups to the 
extent that widely circulated ads do.  The 
risk remains that individuals subjected to 
offensive statements may no longer con-
sider a roommate of another race200 or 
may restrict their search to neighbor-
hoods primarily inhabited by members 
of their own race.  Nonetheless, state-
ments made in private will not be seen 
by potentially thousands of people and 
thus do not contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups in 
the way that widely distributed advertisements do.  Because the 
connection to the government’s integration objectives is more 
tenuous, these prohibitions may not pass even the intermediate 
scrutiny applied to restrictions on commercial speech.  
Furthermore, whether these statements should even be 
classified as commercial speech is less clear.  Once prospective 
cohabitants are identified and roommate seekers and applicants 
are determining whether they will be compatible, their dialogue 
may be considered speech afforded full First Amendment pro-
tection and restrictions upon it subjected to strict scrutiny.  This 
dialogue cannot be characterized as an advertisement, and al-
though it relates to a commercial transaction—the rental of 
housing for financial gain—the Supreme Court has explained 
that speech does not retain its commercial character “when it is 
inextricably intertwined with otherwise protected speech.”201  
Because locating suitable applicants does not require the vast 
majority of roommate seekers to include discriminatory prefer-
ences when they are placing ads, such statements are not 
“inextricable” in the advertising context.  But, there is nothing 
commercial about a roommate seeker explaining that she wants 
a roommate who will join her in communal prayer, and she is 
unlikely to find such a cohabitant if unable to discuss religion 
when interviewing applicants.  As it cannot be extracted from 
the speech related to the commercial transaction, this speech 
should retain its full First Amendment protections.   
Therefore, the government cannot regulate the state-
ments made when roommate seekers interview applicants, at 
least those related to determining compatibility.  Outside the 
commercial speech realm, “content-based restrictions are sus-
tained only in the most extraordinary circumstances: ‘The First 
Amendment forbids the government from regulating speech in 
ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of oth-
ers.’”202  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,203 the Court concluded that 
prohibiting the use of inflammatory symbols was unconstitu-
tional despite its “belief that burning a cross in someone’s front 
a devout roommate seeker could be 
significantly burdened if unable to 
discuss her religious practice with a 
potential cohabitant. 
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yard [was] reprehensible.”204  Unless the government can show 
that prohibitions on discriminatory statements made when room-
mate seekers are interviewing applicants serve a compelling 
interest—apart from protecting applicants from exposure to rep-
rehensible ideas205—the restrictions also violate the First 
Amendment. 
 A determination that the government can prohibit ra-
cially discriminatory ads, but not statements between individu-
als, risks a counterproductive result.  Roommate applicants who 
respond to non-discriminatory ads could then be subjected to 
offensive statements in a more inimical form, such as those spo-
ken to them directly.  However, scholars analyzing prejudice and 
discrimination in cyberspace suggest that because explicit ex-
pressions of prejudice have become taboo, people are signifi-
cantly less likely to explicitly deny someone a resource or ser-
vice based on discriminatory criteria when interacting with an-
other person in real time.206  Rather, they will find a non-explicit 
excuse for behaving discriminatorily.207   
Prejudice is more likely to be overtly expressed on the 
Internet because of the anonymous and disinhibited nature of the 
forum,208 where people feel free to express themselves in less 
self-conscious and less socially desirable ways.209  One example 
of this phenomenon is cyberbullying.  As explained by a teen-
ager whose friend committed suicide after being harassed by his 
classmates on-line, “You wouldn’t do that to someone’s face, 
but on-line it’s completely different.   You can do whatever you 
want and no one can do anything—you’re at your house they’re 
at their house—it’s different.”210 
Roommate seekers are more likely to be discreet when 
dealing with applicants in person than when placing Internet or 
classified ads.  In most of the cases discussed in Part II, the 
roommate seekers rarely spoke of their own prejudices to the 
complainants; rather, they either claimed that another roommate 
had a problem with the candidate, made the statement to a third 
party, or otherwise diffused their remarks.  In Larrick, the defen-
dant told the applicant that her other roommate did not want to 
live with a black person.211  In Baker, the respondent explained, 
via voicemail, that it was his fundamentalist Christian roommate 
with whom the lesbian applicant “would not get along.” 212  In 
DeSantis, the respondent told the white tester that she was afraid 
of black men. 213  In Marya v. Slakey, the roommate who re-
jected the applicant did not make per se insulting remarks about 
Indians, instead claiming that he feared a third Indian roommate 
would create an environment dominated by a single culture.214  
While the statements made in each case vary in degree of offen-
siveness, the speakers were somewhat sheepish about making 
them.  They may have made more overtlyprejudiced statements 
in an anonymous advertisement.   Thus, prohibiting discrimina-
tory ads, even while permitting discriminatory statements, may 
indeed shield applicants from the most pernicious speech.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Whether it is for months or years, an individual’s 
choice to allow someone to share her living space is a private 
decision.  The government cannot interfere with the individual’s 
ultimate selection without violating her Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  This is no less true when an individual takes a roommate 
in order to defray housing costs.  A conclusion to the contrary 
would mean that those with fewer resources have lesser rights to 
intimate association and privacy.  Such an outcome runs counter 
to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Zablocki v. Redhail215 that 
people may not be deprived of their fundamental rights of asso-
ciation simply because they are poor.  
The more information that a roommate seeker can place 
in an advertisement—about herself and about what she desires in 
a roommate—the less time she will spend interviewing unsuit-
able candidates. Descriptive ads also save applicants the time 
and energy they would otherwise expend contacting people who 
are unlikely to accept them.  Therefore, both sides benefit when 
roommate seekers are granted more leeway in advertising their 
preferences.  Nonetheless, there is a tipping point at which the 
harm that an advertised preference causes outweighs the benefits 
of targeted advertising.  By stigmatizing minority groups, ra-
cially discriminatory ads perpetuate racially homogenous hous-
ing patterns and the resulting social harms.  Although ultimately 
a roommate seeker can rely on any characteristic in choosing a 
cohabitant, saving some time is not worth the damage caused by 
racially discriminatory ads.  Furthermore, unlike preferences 
motivated by practical or religious concerns, like keeping a ko-
sher kitchen, because preferences related to race are often moti-
vated by fear of the unknown, intergroup contact during an inter-
view may cause some roommate seekers to reevaluate their 
prejudices.216 
Fair housing laws should thus balance these competing 
interests.  I urge legislatures to recognize the intimate associa-
tion and privacy concerns that roommate seekers face when 
choosing those with whom they will negotiate taking out the 
garbage, cleaning the bathtub, and whether to set up a Christmas 
tree in the living room.  Because these issues are not encoun-
tered by either traditional or most Mrs. Murphy landlords, fair 
housing laws should be amended to address the special consid-
erations of roommate seekers, but the integration goals of the 
FHA should not be sacrificed. 
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‘There is . . . an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.  That 
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, 
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them. . . .’  
Id. at 97 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
121 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
122 Id. at 625-627. 
123 Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).  
124 515 U.S. at 631. 
125 The bi-racial complainant in Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing v. Larrick 
who was subjected to a racist statement during a telephone conversation de-
scribed her reaction as “angry and hurt,” stating that she “felt as though there had 
been no progress in race relations.” Dep’t of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Lar-
rick, No. H 95-96 Q-0510-02, 1998 CAFEHC LEXIS 15, *8.  And, research has 
shown that exposure to prejudice increases the occurrence of depression, anxi-
ety, and other negative health consequences on people “who perceive high levels 
of discrimination.”  Devah Pager, The Dynamics of Discrimination, Nat'l Pov-
erty Center Working Paper Series #06-11 at 4 (June, 2006) (citing Ronald C. 
Kessler, Kristin D. Mickelson, & David R. Williams, The Prevalence, Distribu-
tion, and Mental Health Correlates of Perceived Discrimination in the United 
States, J. OF HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 40(3), 208-230 (1990)).   
126 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 1972). 
127 Id. at 214. 
128 Id. at 215. 
129 GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 95-96 (Harvard 
Univ. Press) (2002).  
130 Id. at 99. 
131 Id. at 96. 
132 Id. at 100-01. 
133 Id. at 90-91 (citing Camille Zubrinksy Charles, Neighborhood Racial-
Composition Preferences: Evidenced from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. 
PROBS. 379, 386 (2000)). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 90. 
136 Comments on an earlier draft of this article from Eugene Volokh, UCLA 
Professor of Law, given Nov. 7, 2007. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-508 (1981) 
(upholding billboard ban “despite the meager record” showing a connection 
between billboards and traffic safety); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 50-52 (upholding ordinance which prohibited adult theaters: “The 
First Amendment does not require a city . . . to conduct new studies or produce 
[independent] evidence. . . so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is 
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses”) 
(emphasis added); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) 
(“We do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to us accom-
panied by a surfeit of background information”).  But see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[a] commercial 
speech regulation ‘may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote 
support for the government's purpose’”) (citations omitted)). 
141 42 U.S.C §§ 3604-06, 3617 (1969); see Schwemm, supra note 9, at 194. 
142 Proponents of the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart would 
suggest that speech related to any lawful transaction be subject to strict scrutiny.  
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.  
143 As described infra, Section IV 4.c, religion is a less clear category because of 
the overlap with ethnicity. 
144 Senator Mondale explained that segregation and the resulting “ghetto 
schools” created “[o]ne of the most significant barriers impeding progress and 
opportunity for Negroes.”  See 114 Cong. Rec. 2275, 2276 (1968).    Senator 
Javits stated that “the segregation index of racial residential dissimilarity in 207 
cities” is such that, as of 1960, “86 percent of the urban Negro population would 
have to move to all-white or integrated slums in largely all-white neighborhoods 
if the segregation was to be at zero.” See 114 Cong. Rec. 2704 (1968).  Con-
gressman Halpern stated, “[W]e will never bring it about that Negro pupils and 
white pupils go to school together—until we make it possible for Negroes to 
obtain housing outside the ghetto areas of our cities.” See 114 Cong. Rec. 9589 
(1968). 
145 The legislative history of the amendments outlawing discrimination on the 
basis of sex and familial status describes the need to eliminate these types of 
discrimination, but says nothing about creating residential integration for these 
groups.  See Schwemm, supra note 9 at 279 n.417.  One sentence in the 1988 
Amendments suggests that there was an interest in mainstreaming handicapped 
persons: “The Fair Housing Amendments Act [] is a clear pronouncement of a 
national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handi-
caps from the mainstream.” See H.R. Rep. No 100-711 at 18 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2179; see also Schwemm, supra note 9 at 279 n.417.  By 
contrast, the 1988 Amendments contain almost a full page describing the con-
tinuing problem of racial segregation.  See H.R. Rep. No 100-711 at 15-16 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2176-77. 
146 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). The Court’s five-
member majority concluded that St. Paul had failed to show that the statute 
served a compelling interest: “[T]he only interest distinctively served by the 
content limitation is that of displaying the city council’s special hostility toward 
the particular biases thus singled out.  That is precisely what the First Amend-
ment forbids.” Id. at 396.  For a broader discussion, including the concerns ex-
pressed by the dissenting justices, see Schwemm, supra note 9, at 285-289.  
147 See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 225-26. 
148 See Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that housing organizations that might need to increase educational 
programs to combat the misimpression created by real estate advertisements that 
featured only white models had standing). 
149 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (holding that 
total ban on advertising prices for “routine” legal services violated the First 
Amendment where disclaimers or warnings could be required to dissipate the 
possibility of misleading the public); Peel v. Attorney Regis. & Discip. Comm’n 
of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 117 (1990) (holding that an attorney had a First Amendment 
right to advertise his certification as a trial specialist by the National Board of 
Trial Advocacy (NBTA), but the State could require him to include a disclaimer 
stating that the NBTA is a private organization not sanctioned by the State or 
Federal government).  
150 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 614 (1987) (Brennan, J. 
concurring). 
151 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1982 (2001). 
152 In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) the Supreme 
Court explained:  
[T]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that Jews cannot state a § 
1982 claim against other white defendants.  That view rested on the 
notion that because Jews today are not thought to be members of a 
separate race, they cannot make out a claim of racial discrimination 
within the meaning of § 1982. . . . [T]he question before us is . . . 
whether, at the time § 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of 
people that Congress intended to protect. It is evident from the legis-
lative history. . . that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then 
considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the 
statute.  Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action against 
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other members of what today is considered to be part of the Cauca-
sian race. 
Id. at 617-18.  See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Congress that passed the so-called Open Hous-
ing Act in 1968 did not undercut any of the grounds on which § 1982 rests”).  
See also Schwemm, supra note 9. 
153 See generally, Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1575 (2002). 
154 The Court explained:  
As observed above, the white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various 
minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior dis-
crimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.  Not all of 
these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judi-
cial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for 
then the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants.  There is no principled basis for deciding which 
groups would merit ‘heightened judicial solicitude’ and which would 
not.  Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and 
consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose 
societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability 
then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of 
individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications would be 
free from exacting judicial scrutiny.  As these preferences began to have 
their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were 
undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary.  The kind of variable 
sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings 
simply does not lie within the judicial competence—even if they other-
wise were politically feasible and socially desirable.  
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295-97 (1978). 
155 During Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, observant Mus-
lims fast during daylight hours.  See Ramadan on the Net, Holidays on the Net, 
http://www.holidays.net/ramadan/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
156 Were such ads permissible, a Pakistani woman wishing to discriminate 
against all non-Pakistanis could place an ad that said “No Christians.”  Because 
the overwhelming majority of Pakistani Americans are Muslim, see Tinaz Pavri, 
Pakistani Americans: Overview-Religion, http://www.everyculture.com/multi/
Le-Pa/Pakistani-Americans.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2008), she could imper-
missibly dissuade many non-Pakistanis from applying, without significantly 
reducing the pool of applicants she finds acceptable. 
157 See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights 
Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 252 (2006).  Ellickson describes how 
“[m]ost people prefer to consort with those who share their orientations and 
attitudes.”  He states that co-occupants are likely to choose others of similar 
tastes, and that “to the extent that tastes vary according to attributes such as 
social class, age, gender, and ethnicity, participants in a household relationship 
can be expected to show a tendency to cluster accordingly.” 
158 Intentional communities united by religious belief have been uniquely suc-
cessful.  Ellickson contrasts long-lived religious sects that require “dozens of 
adult residents of each of their communities to dine together for virtually all 
meals,” like the Hutterites, who were organized in 1528 and currently have about 
8000 members living on eighty-nine rural settlements in the United States, and 
convents of the Order of Saint Benedict, established in 530 and maintaining just 
under 7000 members in a total of 174 monasteries and convents in the United 
States, with the “secular experiments with strongly communal forms of living 
and dining [that] implode[d] within a handful of years”: Brook Farm in Massa-
chusetts (1841-47), New Harmony in Indiana (lasting only a few years starting in 
1825), and Oneida in New York (1848-1881).  Id. at  272-73. 
159 “[A] pan used to fry a hamburger or a pot used to make stew become fleishig. 
If the fleishig pot or pan is then used to boil milk, [Jewish Law] has been vio-
lated.” Religion Facts – Keeping Kosher: Jewish Dietary Laws, http://
www.religionfacts.com/judaism/practices/kosher.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 
2008). 
160 Believers may be reincarnated into a higher caste only if they have followed 
the rules of their caste during their previous life.  “In this way karma has dis-
couraged people from attempting to rise to a higher caste or to cross caste lines 
for social relations of any kind.” “Caste (social),” Microsoft Encarta Online 
Encyclopedia 2007, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?
refid=761565041 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
161 “All holidays, including birthdays, are considered ‘pagan holidays’ and may 
not be observed by Witnesses.” Religion Facts – Jehovah’s Witnesses and Holi-
days, http://www.religionfacts.com/jehovahs_witnesses/holidays.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2008). 
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100.75(3), which prohibits “selecting media or locations for advertising the sale 
or rental of dwellings which deny particular segments of the housing market 
information about housing opportunities because of . . . religion. . . .”  However, 
roommate seekers could include these locations among the places they list their 
ads.  And, realistically, it is unlikely that anyone would sue an Orthodox Jew 
who, seeking a kosher roommate, listed his apartment exclusively on the bulletin 
board at his synagogue or in a local Jewish newspaper.   
163 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
881 (1990) (holding that Oregon’s application of a generally applicable criminal 
prohibition to the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American 
Church did not violate the free exercise clause). 
164 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2001).  
165 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (West 2004); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 
(West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 73-401 to -404 (Michie Supp. 2004); 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-99 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
1.302-.307 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (Michie 
Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251-258 (West Supp. 2004); 71 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401-2407 (West Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-
80.1-1 to -4 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (West Supp. 2003); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001-.012 (Vernon 2004). 
166 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
167 See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006) (holding that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling state 
interest in prohibiting a religious sect’s sacramental use of a hoasca tea contain-
ing DMT, a hallucinogenic regulated under the Controlled Substances Act). 
168 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (creating exemptions under the free 
exercise clause when a generally applicable law that did not pass strict scrutiny 
substantially burdened religious conduct); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
234 (1972), (holding that a compulsory education law violated the free exercise 
rights of the Amish). 
169 See Hunt v. Hunt, 162 Vt. 423, 436 (1994); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W. 
2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990); Rourke v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Serv., 603 
N.Y.S. 2d 647, 649-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (aff'd, 615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472-73 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994)).  For an exhaustive list, see  Douglas Laycock, Theology 
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the 
Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211-12 (2004). 
170 See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990) (The court 
upheld a landlord’s right not to rent to unmarried cohabitants.  Three justices 
held that the Minnesota Constitution granted far broader religious freedom pro-
tection than the United States Constitution.  Finding the text of the fair housing 
statute dispositive, the concurring justice did not reach the constitutional ques-
tion.); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240, 243 n.15 (Mass. 1994) 
(The court held that the fair housing law substantially burdened the landlord’s 
free exercise rights, but whether Massachusetts had a compelling interest in 
ensuring rental housing to unmarried people was a fact question precluding 
summary judgment.  Three dissenting justices held that the Massachusetts con-
stitution “absolutely protect[ed] the defendants’ right to decline to lease any 
premises to a cohabitating couple”). 
171 Smith v. Fair Hous. & Employment Comm’n (Evelyn Smith), 12 Cal.4th 
1143 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
172 Evelyn Smith predated City of Boerne v. Flores, and thus the Court reviewed 
Smith’s case under the federal RFRA, but an analysis under a state RFRA would 
likely be similar. 
173 12 Cal.4th at 1166-67. 
174 See Christoper L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis For Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994).   Describing the test in religious freedom cases as 
“strict in theory but feeble in fact,” Eisgruber and Sager explain that modern 
strict scrutiny has been relatively deferential.  However, as discussed, prohibi-
tions on discriminatory roommate advertisements related to religious practice are 
unlikely to be upheld even under intermediate scrutiny.  In jurisdictions where 
courts apply rational basis review to RFRA claims, seeking protection under a 
RFRA would be a less viable option than raising a free speech challenge as 
described in section IV.4.b. 
175 See See Bd. of Trs., State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469; supra note 103. 
176 See the discussion in Part IV 4.c regarding advertisements that describe relig-
ion-as-belief versus religion-as-ethnicity. 
177 See supra Part IV.4.b-c. 
178 12 Cal. 4th at 1173 (“[i]t is well established that there is no substantial burden 
placed on an individual's free exercise of religion where a law or policy 
[regulating secular conduct] merely 'operates so as to make the practice of [the 
individual's] religious beliefs more expensive'”) (citations omitted). 
179 Between 2001 and 2004, the number of households paying more than half 
their income for housing— considered “severe cost burdens”—increased by 
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nearly 2 million to a record 15.8 million.  The total record of households paying 
at least 30 percent of income on housing—considered “at least moderate cost 
burdens”—rose from 31.3 million to over 35 million.  The incidence is higher 
among renters.  THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2006, Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University, pg. 25, available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2006/index.htm (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2008). 
180 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (New Jersey’s public accommodations law 
held to violate the Boy Scout’s rights to freedom of association by forcing the 
organization to retain an openly gay assistant scoutmaster)). 
181 468 U.S. at 624-25. 
182 530 U.S. at 648. 
183 Id. at 659. 
184 Id. at 655 (describing its decision in Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)) (purpose of St. Patrick’s 
day parade “was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held 
that the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonethe-
less.”). 
185 530 U.S. at 659. 
186 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
489 F.3d 921, 930 n.2  (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (court’s em-
phasis). 
187 As discussed supra in Part IV.1, such roommate seekers may also raise as-
applied intimate association challenges, arguing that the prohibitions directly and 
substantially interfere with their ability to create an association. 
188 See supra Part IV.4.b. 
189 530 U.S. at 661 (stating “We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views 
of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are 
right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's 
expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept 
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expres-
sive message”). 
190 Additionally, devout roommate seekers may assert a hybrid-rights claim, 
arguing that the advertising restrictions should be reviewed under strict scrutiny 
because more than one constitutional right is implicated: their free exercise 
rights coupled with either expressive association, intimate association, or free 
speech rights.  In Smith, the Supreme Court suggested that a higher standard of 
review may apply where a case involved the Free Exercise clause in conjunction 
with other constitutional protections. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).  However, to date, the Court has yet 
to apply strict scrutiny to a hybrid-rights claim, and Justice Souter has criticized 
the theory in a concurring opinion.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J. concurring) ("[i]f a 
hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, 
then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith 
rule....").  Furthermore, the Second and Sixth Circuits have explicitly rejected the 
hybrid rights language from Smith as dicta, concluding the standard of review 
should not vary “simply with the number of constitutional rights that the plaintiff 
asserts have been violated.” Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 
2003); see also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Uni., Coll. of Vet. 
Med., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.1993).  Thus, the hybrid-rights approach seems a less 
viable option. 
191 See 42 USCA § 3604(c) (2003). 
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question,’ regardless of the defendant's intent”) (quoting Ragin v. N.Y. Times 
Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2nd Cir. 1991)); see also Schwemm, supra note 9, at 
210-11. 
193 See GUIDELINES ON HOW TO ADVERTISE WITHOUT VIOLATING HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS, available at http://www.ndfhc.org/fair_housing/PDF-
NDDOL%20Fair%20Housing%20Ads.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). Because 
the statement and advertisement prohibitions are both contained in 42 USCA § 
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194 Id. 
195 Those who strictly observe the Sabbath are forbidden from activities includ-
ing, but not limited to: using the phone, operating anything electric or electronic, 
and flipping light switches from 18 minutes before sunset on Fridays until night-
fall (approximately 40 minutes after sunset) on Saturdays.  See Ask Moses, 
http://www.askmoses.com/article_list.html?h=208 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).   
196 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980). 
197 Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. at 689 n.5 (emphasis added). 
198 The District of Columbia Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based 
on a wider range of criteria including political affiliation.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
2512(a) (1992). 
199 See Goffman, supra note 55. 
200 The complainant in Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Larrick 
who was subjected to a racist statement during a telephone conversation de-
scribed how her experience “changed her feelings about Caucasians,” stating that 
she “began to avoid socializing with Caucasians, except her mother.” Dep’t of 
Fair Employment & Hous. v. Larrick, No. H 95-96 Q-0510-02, 1998 CAFEHC 
LEXIS 15, *8.   
201 See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
202 S. Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 
888 (7th Cir. 1991). (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). 
203 See generally, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  The statute 
under review only outlawed cross-burning only when the underlying purpose 
was to insult or provoke violence “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender” and was therefore unconstitutional content discrimination.   Id. at 391.  
204 Id. at 396. 
205 Although St. Paul argued that its statute fell within an exemption permitting 
content discrimination aimed at the “secondary effects” of speech, id. at 394 
(citation omitted), the Court stated that ‘[l]istener’ reactions to speech’ are not a 
type of secondary effect that make content discrimination constitutional.  Id. at 
394.  “The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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THE SOCIAL NET: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE  247, 
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L.Saxe, Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and 
Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546-63 (1980)). 
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208 Id.  Glaser and Kahn compare behavior in cyberspace to the pre-civil rights 
era conduct revealed in a classic study conducted by sociologist R.T. LaPiere.  
As reported in Richard T. LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Actions, 13 SOC. FORCES 230-37 
(Dec. 1934), LaPiere traveled around the United States with a Chinese couple in 
1934 seeking public accommodations in hotels, auto camps, restaurants, and 
cafés.  They were only turned away 1 out of 251 times.  Six months later, 
LaPiere sent questionnaires to each of the establishments and asked if they 
would accommodate a Chinese guest.  Over 90% responded that they would not. 
La Piere’s analysis focused on the unreliability of questionnaires as predictors of 
how people will behave when confronted with a live human being, but the study 
also suggests that people are more likely to express overt prejudice in an anony-
mous, disinhibited forum.  Id. at 236. 
209 Glaser & Kahn, supra note 206, at 250. 
210 Frontline: Growing up Online: (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kidsonline/ (Go to chapter 
6, Cyberbullying, at approximately 4:18). 
211 Dep’t of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Larrick, No. H 95-96 Q-0510-02, 1998 
CAFEHC LEXIS 15, *7. 
212 Dep’t. of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Baker, No. H 97-98 Q-0649-00gu, 
1999 CAFEHC LEXIS 14, *4. 
213 Dep’t of Fair Employment & Hous. v. DeSantis, No. 02-12, 2002 WL 
1313078 (Cal.F.E.H.C.) at *3. 
214 Marya v. Slakey, 190 F.Supp.2d 95, 98 (D.Mass 2001). 
215 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
216 See generally Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test 
of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006).  
Synthesizing 713 independent samples from 515 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp 
conclude that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice.   The 
positive effects of intergroup contact are enhanced by equal status between the 
groups in the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support 
of authorities, law or custom, but these conditions are not essential for the con-
tact to achieve a positive outcome.  Id. at 766.  Their analysis shows that inter-
group contact effects generalize beyond the individuals in the particular situa-
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